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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
KAREN MARIE JOHNSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860222-CA 
Category no. & 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN 3 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a convictior of possession of a 
controlled substance in violation of Utah code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(1953# as amended) after a trial in the Th|.rd District Court. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the a*,^^ «ader Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1983, as amended). 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTER QN APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant was unreasonably detained in 
violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. 
2. Whether this Court should interpret Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and Utih Code Ann. S 77-7-15 
(1982) differently than the Federal Fourth Amendment. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUSES, AND RULES 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah (1896): 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons# houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982) provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
possessing a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (1953, as amended). 
Defendant was convicted on April 1, 1987, after a bench trial in 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACT? 
On November 3, 1986, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Deputy 
Steve Stroud of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office observed a 
vehicle with a defective tail light at about 3200 South, 900 East 
(T. 5-6). Prior to stopping the vehicle, the Deputy ran a check 
on the license plates to determine the name of the registered 
owner (T. 6). Once stopped, he approached the driver, Sherry 
Johnson, and upon request, she produced a driver's license but 
stated there was no vehicle registration (T. 6). Upon 
discovering that the driver was not the registered owner and that 
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there was no registration in the vehicle, Deputy Stroud, 
suspecting that the vehicle may have been stolen, requested 
identification from defendant, the only passenger in the vehicle 
(T. 6-8. 13). Defendant responded that sh^ did not have any 
identification, despite the fact that she had a Utah I.D. card in 
her purse (T. 7, 14). The Deputy then ask^d defendant for her 
name and date of birth to which she complied (T. 7)• 
According to the Deputy, he did not ask the defendant 
to remain in the vehicle, but rather, he simply said he would "be 
right back" and returned to his vehicle to run a check on the 
information and fill out a traffic citatio^ i (T. 7-8, 21). Police 
dispatch responded that the license of the driver was suspended 
and that defendant had several outstanding warrants (T. 8)• 
Upon completing the citation, thp Deputy placed 
defendant under arrest for the outstanding warrants (T. 8-9). 
Incident to the arrest, the Deputy searched a bag in defendants 
possession and discovered marijuana and various drug 
paraphernalia (T. 10-11, Stated Exhibit 1). 
Based upon the evidence seized, defendant was charged 
with Unlawful Possession of Controlled Substance, a Third Degree 
Felony, Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B 
Misdemeanor and Possession of Burglary Tools, a Class B 
Misdemeanor (R. 7-8). Prior to trial, defbndant moved to 
suppress the evidence seized at the time of the arrest claiming 
it was fruit of an unlawful seizure in violation of her State and 
Federal Constitutional rights (R. 14-15). After an evidentiary 
hearing and based upon the arguments and memorandum, the trial 
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court denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 19) . The trial 
court found that the deputy "had a legitimate reason to ask the 
passenger as to her identity to determine the identity of the 
driver, because the vehicle's registration was not present, and 
the owner was not known, and . . • the officer was exercising a 
legitimate concern in regards to the ownership of the vehicle and 
to whether the vehicle may have possibly either been stolen or 
being driven without possibly the owner's consent." (T. 47). 
While the court noted that the evidence was unclear whether or 
not there was a detention, it clearly found that the brief 
detention, if any, while investigating the traffic stop, was 
reasonable (T. 47-48)• 
After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of 
possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, and 
upon the State's motion, the remaining charges were dismissed (R. 
94)• Defendant was sentenced to one year in the Utah State 
Prison, execution of the sentence was suspended, and defendant 
was placed on probation for one year (R. 98-99)• Defendant now 
appeals. 
SUMMARY Of ARGUMENT 
Even assuming defendant was detained while the Deputy 
prepared the traffic citation, such a detention was investigatory 
and was based upon reasonable suspicion that the vehicle may have 
been stolen. Balancing the minimal intrusion on defendant's 
personal security against the legitimate and weighty public 
interests, the detention was reasonable applying Fourth Amendment 
standards. The Deputy's brief detention of defendant as a 
4-
passenger in a vehicle stopped for a minor traffic violation was 
permissible and reasonable considering safety and investigatory 
matters relating to the traffic stop. 
Defendant failed to raise the Utah statutory argument 
in the trial court and, therefore, it should not be considered on 
appeal. Any distinctions between Utah Constitutional law and 
Federal search and seizure standards should be made by the Utah 
Supreme Court. To present, the Utah Supreme Court has not made 
any such distinctions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT UNREASONABLY DETAINED IN 
VIOLATION OF HER FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred 
in admitting evidence seized from her person incident to an 
arrest for outstanding warrants. She alleges that she was 
unconstitutionally and unreasonably detained as a passenger in a 
vehicle stopped for a minor traffic violation. Defendant's claim 
must fail. 
The preliminary issue is whether defendant was 
detained. In its ruling on the suppression motion, the trial 
court noted that the evidence was in dispute whether or not the 
defendant was required to remain while the Deputy prepared the 
traffic citation (T. 47). The trial court did not make a clear 
finding whether or not there was a detention (T. 48). Instead, 
the court ruled that the Deputy could have properly detained 
defendant for a reasonable period of time while investigating the 
traffic stop (T. 48)• Likewise, this Court need not determine 
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whether a detention occurred, because, even assuming that 
defendant's police encounter constituted a brief investigative 
detention, the detention was appropriate and reasonable under 
Fourth Amendment principles. 
The appropriate standard for investigative detentions 
was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47, 51 
(1979); and is codified in Utah as follows: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982) . £££ also United States v. 
fieCfllflSr 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
ttfiXXittr 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984); State v. Swanioan. 699 
P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). The reasonable suspicion standards also 
applies to investigative stops involving vehicles. United States 
v. Sharpe. U.S. , , 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1573 (1985). 
Among the governmental interests protected by the 
reasonable suspicion test contained in S 77-7-15 are effective 
crime prevention and detection. Law enforcement officers must be 
able, "in appropriate circumstances, and in an appropriate manner 
[to] approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly 
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make 
an arrest." United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983), 
quoting Terry« 392 U.S. at 22, in order to protect these 
governmental interests. 
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The undisputed facts in the present case are as 
follows; (1) that the Deputy made a valid traffic stop; (2) that 
the driver was not the registered owner of the vehicle; and (3) 
that there was no registration in the vehicle (T. 6)• As the 
trial court noted, "the officer had a legitimate reason to ask 
the passenger as to her identity to determine the identity of the 
driver, because the vehicle's registration was not present, and 
the owner was not known, and I think the officer was exercising a 
legitimate concern in regards to the ownership of the vehicle and 
to whether the vehicle may have possibly been either stolen or 
being driven without possibly the owner's consent" (T. 47)• 
Based upon the reasonable suspicion that the vehicle may have 
been stolen along with the need to further investigate the 
identity of the driver and her relationship to the vehicle owner, 
Deputy Stroud could have reasonably required defendant to remain 
seated in the stopped vehicle while he completed the 
investigation and issued the citation. 
The United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse. 
440 U.S. 648 (1979) set forth the constitutional standard to be 
applied in traffic stops where the occupants are detained. The 
Court explained that: 
The essential purpose of the proscriptions in 
the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard 
of "reasonableness" upon the exercise of 
discretion by government officials, including 
law enforcement agents, in order "'to 
safeguard the privacy and security of 
individuals against arbitrary invasions. . . 
• •" Marshall Vi Barlow's. Inc- 436 u.s. 307, 
312 (1978), quoting Camflra Vt Municipal 
Court. 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Thus, the 
permissibility of a particular law 
enforcement practice is judged by balancing 
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its intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests. . . . 
id., at 653-54 (citations omitted). This Court has similarly 
balanced the competing interests in detention cases. State v. 
Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987). This Court noted as 
follows: 
Thus, in considering the constitutionality 
of Trujillo's seizure, we must weigh the 
competing and often conflicting interests 
between the rights of individuals to be free 
from unnecessary harassment or arbitrary 
interference from law officers, and the 
interest of the public in being protected 
from crime. . • • 
Id. (citations omitted.) Applying the balancing test to the 
instant case, one must conclude, as did the trial court, that the 
brief detention, if any, was reasonable and based upon legitimate 
governmental interests. 
On one side of the scale, it is difficult to conceive a 
less intrusive detention. Here, the defendant was seated as 
passenger in the stopped vehicle (T. 7). According to the 
Deputy, defendant was not asked to exit nor remain in the vehicle 
(T. 21-22) . Defendant was not detained any longer than it took 
to issue the traffic citation, no more than fifteen minutes (T. 
8-9, 28). Realistically, it is unlikely that defendant wished 
anything other than to remain comfortably seated in the vehicle 
while the citation was being issued. Under the circumstances, 
the intrusion on defendant's personal security interests should 
be found da fflinilBUB* 
On the other side, the Deputy's investigation of 
matters relating to the traffic stop promoted legitimate 
governmental concerns regarding public safety and detection of 
criminal activity. Certainlyr the Deputy's approach of simply 
asking defendant for identification and permitting her to remain 
seated in the vehicle was the least intrusive means of pursuing 
the governmental interest. The Deputyfs conduct was neither 
random or arbitrary but was based on articulable facts creating 
reasonable suspicion. 
Balancing the minimal intrusion on defendants security 
interests against the legitimate public interest in highway 
safety and crime detection, the trial court did not err in 
finding that the detention of defendant was proper in pursuing 
the traffic stop and stolen vehicle investigation (T. 47-48). 
A further basis justifying a minimal intrusion on the 
free movement of a vehicle passenger is the safety of the police 
officer. The United State Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) ruled that a police officer may order 
a driver out of a vehicle during a routine traffic stop. The 
Court balanced the driver's personal liberty against the safety 
of the police officer. Regarding the latter, the Court noted 
that " '[alccording to one study, approximately 30 percent of 
police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a 
suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer 
Shootings—A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Crim. L. C. and P.S. 93 
(1963) •• Adams v» Williams, 407 u.s. 143, 148 n.3 (1972)." Minima 
at 110. The Court further stated, "We think it too plain for 
argument that the State's proffered justification—the safety of 
the officer—is both legitimate and weighty." !£• 
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On the other side of the scale, the Court found the 
intrusion on the driver's liberty to be £j£ minimus. The driver 
having already been detained by the initial traffic stop, the 
issue remaining is whether the driver should remain seated in the 
vehicle or along side it. !£• at 111. The Court concluded that 
"a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against 
legitimate concerns for the officers safety." Id. 
Other courts have extended the Mimms ruling to allow a 
police officer to detain passengers in a routine traffic stop by 
ordering the passengers out of the vehicle. People v. Branch. 
134 Misc.2d 705, 512 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Supp. 1987); People v. 
Liviqni. 88 A.D.2d 386, 453 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1982), afffd., 58 
N.Y.2d 894, 460 N.Y.S.2d 530, 447 N.E.2d 78 (1983); People v. 
David L.. 56 N.Y.2d 698, 451 N.Y.S.2d 722, 436 N.E.2d 1324 
(1981), cert, denied 459 U.S. 866 (1982). In People V, MgLavrJn, 
120 A.D.2d 270, 508 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1986), the New York Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division upheld a police officer's asking a 
passenger to step out of the car as constitutional. £&• In 
McLaurin. the police pulled over a car for speeding and asked the 
passenger and driver to get out of the car. The Officer noticed 
a bulge in the passenger's jacket, searched him, found a gun, and 
placed him under arrest. The officer never issued a speeding 
ticket. The defendant argued that the gun should be suppressed 
because the Officer had no reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity or that he was in danger. Id* at 431. 
Nevertheless, the McLaurin court ruled that the police 
officer acted properly, thus extending the MLimma ruling to a 
passenger of a car stopped for a traffic violation. Id.. The 
court noted as follows: 
We fail to discern any appreciable difference 
between driver and passenger in the degree of 
risk posed to the safety of a police officer. 
Hence, police officers are not required, as 
defendant contends, to treat passengers 
differently from the driver, and we reject 
the argument that the circumstances which 
render it permissible to order a driver out 
of a car after a lawful stop for a traffic 
violation are not equally applicable to a 
passenger. Before a police officer orders a 
passenger out of a car, he is not required to 
have, separate and distinct from the 
underlying traffic violation which serves as 
the predicate for the stop, an articulable 
basis to support a suspicion either as to the 
existence of criminal activity by the 
passenger or that he poses a threat to the 
officer's safety. 
J&. at 433. 
Applying the rational in McLaurin to the present case, 
if a police officer making a routine traffic stop is permitted to 
detain any passengers by ordering them to e^ cit the vehicle, it 
certainly follows that it is no more intrusive for a police 
officer to request that the passengers remain seated during the 
traffic stop. 
Several legitimate governmental interests are promoted 
by allowing a police officer to request that a passenger remain 
seated during a routine traffic stop. First, the safety of the 
officer. Some experts suggest that it is safer for a police 
officer in a routine traffic stop to not allow the occupants to 
get out of the car. Pennsylvania Vt Mimms# 434 u.s. 106, 119 
n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Second, to solicit the 
passengers aid in identifying the driver and owner of the vehicle 
and whether the driver has the owner's permission to operate the 
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vehicle. United States v. Harris. 528 F.2d 1327f 1330 (1975). 
Third, to question the passenger whether he or she is licensed to 
drive in the event that the driver is unable or unlicensed to 
drive the vehicle from the scene of the stop. State v. Davis, 
452 So.2d 1208f 1212 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1984). Finally, where a 
routine traffic stop is escalated into something more based upon 
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, a police 
officer may detain the vehicle occupants for further 
investigation. Thus, balancing the legitimate governmental 
interests noted above against the minimal intrusion on 
defendants personal security, the Deputy's brief investigative 
detention of defendant while preparing the traffic citation was 
reasonable given the circumstances. 
Defendant cites United States v. Luckett. 484 F.2d 89 
(1973) in support of her claim. However, the factual background 
in Luckett is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand. In 
Luckett* the police officer detained an individual to run a 
warrant check after the officer had completed a jay walking 
citation. Id., at 90. Since the officer had satisfied the 
purpose of the initial stop, the court found that no 
justification based upon reasonable suspicion existed to continue 
the detention longer that necessary to issue the citation. Id, 
at 91. In the instant case, defendant was detained only so long 
as necessary to issue the traffic citation to the driver of the 
vehicle in which defendant was a passenger (T. 8-9)• Further, 
the detention was based upon reasonable suspicion that the 
vehicle in which the defendant was seated may have been stolen 
(T. 7-8) . 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT INTERPRET RELEVANT UTAH 
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DIFFERENTLY 
THAT ITS FEDERAL COUNTERPART 
Defendant urges this Court to extend individual 
protections outlined in Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982) and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution beyond Federal 
Fourth Amendment standards. First, the State statutory argument 
was not presented to the trial court, and therefore should not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. See State v. Carter * 
707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985). Second, while this court has 
noted that Utah need not continue to accept the United States 
Supreme Court's constantly changing interpretation of federal 
search and seizure law in interpreting its own Constitution, such 
a change should come from the Utah Supreme Court. State v. 
Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 103 (Utah App. 1987) (Billings, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)• Lastly, the Utah 
Supreme Court has most recently noted that it has never as yet 
drawn any distinctions between the protections afforded in 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment, gtate v. Watts. 76 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Feb. 17, 
1988) . 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm 
defendant's conviction below. 
DATED this U^ day of March, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney Gener 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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